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I. INTRODUCTION
The International Criminal Court (Court or ICC) came into force on
July 1, 2002.1 It had 139 signatories and 89 parties 2 through the later part
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many editors of this journal who put in countless hours of their time to bring this article to publication."
1. Chronology of the International Criminal Court [hereinafter Multilateral Treaties],
available at http://www2.icc-cpi.intfMenus/ICC/About+the+Court/ICC+at+a+glance/Chronology+of
+the+ICC.htm (last visited October 8, 2009). See also Press Release, In First Meeting, Assembly of
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of the Bush Administration.3 In an effort to make this one of the most open
treaties to come into force, as Pellet notes, States not a signatory as of
December 31, 2000, are free to join at any time without objection by
Member States. 4 After more than a half century of work to bring this Court
into existence,5 the ratification of the treaty took place after the General
Assembly convened from June 15 to July 17 of 1998, at the United Nations
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries "to finalize and adopt a
convention on the establishment of an international criminal court. ' 6 As the
ICC website notes,
One of the primary objectives of the United Nations is securing
universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of
individuals throughout the world. In this connection, few topics
are of greater importance than the fight against impunity and the
struggle for peace and justice and human rights in conflict
situations in today's world.
7
The establishment of the Court reflects a need to bring to justice those
who would otherwise go unpunished, as has happened in the past; in theory,
the Court's existence means this will no longer be the case in the future.
Further, the goal is to have the power to bring a citizen of any nation,
including those who are non-signatories, before the Court for the crime of
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.8 The ICC was
States Parties to Rome Statute of Internal Criminal Court Approves Financial, Adminstrative
Arrangements (March 9, 2009).
2. Multilateral Treaties, supra note 1. The 139 signatories signed the statute, a preliminary
step that had to be taken by December 31, 2000, by those states that intended to later ratify it and
thereby become parties to it. According to Schabas, "Significant delays between signature and
ratification were to be expected, because most States needed to undertake significant legislative changes
in order to comply with the obligations imposed by the Statute, and it was normal for them to want to
resolve these issues before formal ratification." WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 20 (2nd ed., Cambridge University Press 2004).
3. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 1.
4. Alain Pellet, Entry Into Force and Amendment of the Statute, in The Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court: A Commentary, in Volume I, 145, 153 (Antonio Cassese, et al. eds.,
Oxford University Press 2002).
5. Establishment of an International Criminal Court--Overview, available at
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/general/overview.htm (last visited October 8, 2009).
6. U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, June 15-July 17, 1998, 96, U.N.Doc A/CONF.183/SR.8 [hereinafter, U.N. Diplomatic
Conference].
7. See Establishment of an International Criminal Court--Overview, supra note 5.
8. U.N. Diplomatic Conference, supra note 6, at 1i, 14, 25.
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established with the understanding that, "[n]ations agree that criminals
should normally be brought to justice by national institutions. But in times
of conflict, whether internal or international, such national institutions are
often either unwilling or unable to act .... 9 Therefore, the first issue is
whether the Court's authority and even existence have been strengthened or
weakened since Clinton 0 first signed onto the ICC just before he left
office." The Bush Administration subsequently refused to participate in
the Court12 the following year. 13 In a post-September 11 world, as will be
demonstrated later, this departure from the Court has been dramatic; indeed,
former President Bush's action was due in part to the possibility of
American soldiers or personnel involved in the war on terrorism being
brought before the ICC. 14 President Bush 5 has said,
9. See Establishment of an International Criminal Court-Overview, supra note 5.
10. President Clinton noted his reason for supporting the ICC:
The United States is today signing the 1998 Rome Treaty on the International
Criminal Court. In taking this action, we join more than 130 other countries that
have signed by the December 31, 2000, deadline established in the treaty. We do
so to reaffirm our strong support for international accountability and for bringing
to justice perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. We
do so as well because we wish to remain engaged in making the ICC an
instrument of impartial and effective justice in the years to come.
Bill Clinton, Clinton's Words: 'The Right Action' N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2001, at A6, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/0l/0I/world/clinton-s-words-the-right-action.html (October 8,2009).
11. Orentlicher notes that the United States was supportive of a permanent international
criminal court under President Clinton. Diane F. Orentlicher, Unilateral Multilateralism: United States
Policy Toward the International Criminal Court, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 415, 415-416 (2004).
12. In a communication received on 6 May 2002, the Government of the United States of
America informed the Secretary-General of the following:
This is to inform you, in connection with the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court adopted on July 17, 1998, that the United States does not intend to
become a party to the treaty. Accordingly, the United States has no legal
obligations arising from its signature on December 31, 2000. The United States
request that its intention not to become a party, as expressed in this letter, be
reflected in the depositarys status lists relating to this treaty.
Letter from John Bolton, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control, to Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary
General (May 6, 2002).
13. See John R. Worth, Globalization and the Myth of Absolute National Sovereignty:
Reconsidering the "Un-signing" of the Rome Statute and the Legacy of Senator Bricker, 79 IND. L.J.
245, 245 (2004).
14. Everett argues that American servicemembers are protected under the ICC because,
[T]he ICC Statute does make available to the United States a means for insisting
that U.S. authorities--not the ICC--have the opportunity to investigate and to
prosecute alleged crimes by servicemembers against the 'Law of Nations.'
ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
I strongly reject the ICC. I'm not going to accept an ICC. I'm not
going to put ourselves in a position where our soldiers and
diplomats get hauled into a Court over which we have got-
[with] the prosecutors whom we don't know, the judges-I mean,
we're not going to allow ourselves to do that. And our friends
shouldn't want us to be put in that position.
1 6
Is the former President right? Since his remarks on September 30,
2002, George W. Bush has continued to argue that the United States should
not participate in the Court. Specifically, the White House continued to
push a different agenda: U.S.-run tribunals in the wake of Afghanistan and
the stabilization of Iraq through the use of both U.S. and international
forces under its command.
The following three areas will be addressed in this paper: 1) The
International Criminal Court: Its History and the Evolution of its Articles;
2) former President Bush and the International Criminal Court; and 3) The
Bush Administration and World Opinion. Together, these will constitute
the basic structure of the argument that the President Barack H. Obama and
his Administration may be forced to deal with the ICC due to events
throughout the world and the international response to the U.S. role in those
events.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ITS HISTORY AND THE
EVOLUTION OF ITS ARTICLES
The ICC has been in development for over fifty years. The process
was started in Nuremberg and continued through recent tribunals in
Yugoslavia. The ICC Statute (Rome Statute) that was finally presented in
draft form in 1998 was the culmination of this history and the
crystallization of a whole body of law. The challenges faced by the
Nuremberg Tribunal following the Second World War, such as the need to
create a unified court for the prosecution of one set of war criminals, called
for the establishment of a court whose function was to deal with some of
Perhaps, therefore, the threat to American servicemembers posed by the Statute
may be less ominous than many have supposed.
Robinson 0. Everett, American Servicemembers and the ICC in The United States and the International
Criminal Court 137, 147 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
2000).
15. Unless noted otherwise, "Bush" will refer to the former President, George W. Bush, and
not his father, former President George H.W. Bush.
16. George Bush, Remarks Prior to Discussions with President Alvaro Uribe of Colombia and
an Exchange With Reporters, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Docs. 39 (Sept. 30, 2002) [hereinafter Remarks
with President Alvaro Uribe].
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the worst crimes confronting humankind. The Rome Statute was designed
to address problematic parts of international law that in the past have been
dealt with via ad hoc criminal tribunals. 17 The next section will review the
specific history of the ICC. This will be followed by a review of the Rome
Statute itself.
A. History of the International Criminal Court
According to Cassese, the ICC's history can be conceptualized in
terms of four distinct phases:
1) [A]bortive early attempts (1919-1945);
2) [C]riminal prosecution in the aftermath of World War II:
the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals (1945-1946);
3) [P]reparation for the future ICC: the work of the
International Law Commission (ILC) (1950-1954, 1990-
1994); and
4) [P]ost-Cold War "new world order": the development of
the two ad hoc tribunals and the emergence of the ICC
Statute (1991-1998).8
The first attempts at creating an international criminal court were
designed to deal with the crimes against humanity committed during the
First World War. In the wake of the horrors witnessed in this conflict, the
international community sought a court with jurisdiction over these crimes.
This effort failed, however, because the Allies allowed Germany to try its
own citizens.' 9 In the end, of the 901 accused war criminals whose names
were submitted by the Allies, only 13 were convicted, and all received light
sentences.2°
The aftermath of the Second World War brought the beginnings of
what might now be considered an international court. The crimes against
humanity in connection with the Nazi genocide of Jews led to the
establishment of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals.21 It was at these
trials that the first semblance of what would later become the ICC took
shape. The German leaders were tried for acts committed against their own
17. Antonio Cassese, From Nuremberg to Rome: International Military Tribunals to the
International Criminal Court, in Volume I, THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: A COMMENTARY 3-4 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., Oxford University Press 2002).
18. Id. at 4.
19. Paul D. Marquardt, Law Without Borders: The Constitutionality of an International
Criminal Court, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73, 79-80 (1995).
20. Id.
21. See Cassese, supra note 17, at 5.
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citizens under the principle that individuals and states alike are responsible
under international law.22 These tribunals set forth many of the principles
that would later be central to the evolution of the ICC, notably, the idea that
people can be tried for crimes against humanity, even when those crimes
are committed in an official capacity.
The need to prosecute Nazi war criminals at the Nuremberg Tribunal
added to the difficulty of establishing a court to deal with some of the worst
crimes confronting humankind. Following the Second World War,
however, the ILC was created23 with the intended purpose of addressing
some of the problems encountered by both the Nuremberg and Tokyo
tribunals.
24
Roughly around the next thirty years was a period in which the ILC
attempted, but ultimately failed, to establish an international criminal
court.25  However, it was also during this period that the first laws
comprising the basis for the ICC were prepared in the Draft Code of
Crimes. Subsequently, however, the Draft Code's successor, the Draft
Statute of the Court, was tabled by the United Nations in 1953.26
One of the major obstacles to the creation of an international court
such as the ICC during this period was the Cold War.27 The problem, as
Marquardt points out, was that the Soviets would only accept review by a
court where they either had veto power, or the option not to participate in,
or be subject to, the court;28 neither condition was acceptable to the other
participants. While the Cold War and the unresolved disagreements
between Russia and other nations both complicated and delayed the
process, the fall of the Berlin Wall, however, suddenly changed all of that.29
The idea of the court had languished until the fall of the Soviet Union in
1989; within a few short years of that event, however, the ILC was again
called upon to create a draft for the Rome Statute.
Starting in 1992, the ILC began on a draft that would take a decade to
complete, which the international society and the world legal community
would use as a foundation for the ICC. The ILC again took up the task of
drafting the statutes for the Court in 1993 and adopted this document in
22. See Marquardt, supra note 19, at 82.
23. See Cassese, supra note 17, at 9.
24. Id. at 9-10.
25. Id. at 9.
26. Id. at 9.
27. See id. at 10; see also Marquardt, supra note 19, at 85-86.
28. See Marquardt, supra note 19, at 86.
29. See Cassese, supra note 17, at 11.
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1994.30 With the ILC convening regularly, in 1994, 1995, and 1996, the
draft underwent many revisions. Throughout these years, the ILC sought to
find a middle ground that would allow the maximum number of nations to
sign on, while still retaining many of the most important features regarding
such issues as jurisdiction and enforcement.
It was also during this period that there came to be a greater global
awareness of the need for a permanent court to deal with war crimes,
following the events in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.31  The
experience of the military tribunals that were created to prosecute crimes in
both of these countries could be drawn upon in order to create an effective
international criminal court, one that would promise justice for those who
could seek redress nowhere else. The Draft Statute and Draft Final Act
were submitted to the Diplomatic Conference at Rome from June 15 to July
17 of 1998.32 The eventual establishment of the Court in 2002, ushered in a
new period in international law marked by the existence of a permanent
court, which in theory is able to bring to justice those who commit crimes
against humanity.
33
On July 1, 2002, the Court was finally formally established.34 Since
former President George W. Bush took office, however, the United States
government has opposed it, reversing the policy of the previous Bill Clinton
Administration. 3' As will be explained, the Bush Administration's
opposition has been both condemned and praised. For now, this paper will
turn next to the issue of how the ICC articles have been transformed over
time.
30. Id. at 10.
31. See Mark A. Drumbl, Rule of Law Amid Lawlessness: Counseling the Accused in
Rwanda's Domestic Genocide Trials, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 545, 548 (1998); Evo Popoff,
Note, Inconsistency and Impunity in International Human Rights Law: Can the International Criminal
Court Solve the Problems Raised by the Rwanda and Augusto Pinochet Cases, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.
REv. 363, 378-79 (2001); Celina Schocken, The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Overview and
Recommendations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 436, 456 (2002).
32. See Cassese, supra note 17, at 17.
33. Id. at 18.
34. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 1. There has been an official ICC website in
existence after the United Nations' one stopped being updated as of December 31, 2003. www.icc-
cpi.int. According to the ICC, "The seat of the Court is The Hague in The Netherlands. The Court will
be temporarily housed at 'de Arc' on the outskirts of The Hague before moving to its permanent
premises at the Alexanderkazeme. It is envisaged that the permanent premises will be ready for
occupation between 2007 and 2009." What is the ICC, available at www.ciaonet.org/casestudy/
media/murOI_a.html (last visited July 16, 2009).
35. Fiona McKay, U.S. Unilateralism and International Crimes: The International Criminal
Court and Terrorism, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 455, 463-65 (2004).
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B. The Transformation of the International Criminal Court's Articles
In 1992, the ILC started working on the draft of the laws governing the
ICC. The resulting articles of the Rome Statute were to be focused on
international treaties of the many nation-states, especially with regard to
crimes against humanity. At its 46th session, in 1994, after taking into
account comments from participating nation-states and a number of other
bodies, a Draft Statute for the ICC was finally adopted.36 The only crimes
that were not clearly defined in the Rome Statute were crimes of aggression
by nation-states.37
1. Finalizing the Rome Statute
In 1994, the ILC adopted the Draft Statute of the ICC; this statute
consisted of sixty articles with commentaries.38 The next two years would
see this initial draft go through a number of revisions, taking into account
commentaries from any number of sources. Most of the changes took place
on the ILC draft in Working Groups 39 and focused on such issues as
jurisdiction and the role of the U.N. Security Council. Many of these
changes were in place by 1998. In June of that year, representatives from
all over the world met in Rome in order to determine the shape of the final
draft.
While many of those at the Rome meeting agreed on including crimes
against humanity, there was strong opposition to this from four of the five
permanent Security Council members; 40 the United Kingdom was the one
exception, in part because it had already decided to join the Court.'
Fearing that its soldiers or other representatives would be brought before
36. James Crawford, The Work of the International Law Commission, in Volume I, THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 23, 28-29 (Antonio Cassese, et
al. eds., Oxford University Press 2002).
37. Giorgio Gaja, The Long Journey towards Repressing Aggression, in Volume I, THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 427, 430-32 (Antonio Cassese,
et al. eds., Oxford University Press 2002).
38. Adriaan Bos, From the International Law Commission to the Rome Conference (1994-
1998), in Volume I, THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY
35, 36 (Antonio Cassese, et al. eds., Oxford University Press 2002).
39. Id. at 64.
40. The five permanent Security Council members include: Republic of China, Fance, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Island, and the
United States of America. U.N. Charter art. 23, para. 1.
41. Philippe Kirsch & Darryl Robinson, Reaching Agreement at the Rome Conference, in
Volume I, THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 67, 71
(Antonio Cassese, et al. eds., Oxford University Press 2002).
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the Court, representatives of the United States, including the executive and
members of Congress, attempted to further limit the jurisdiction of the
Court.42  The other participants, however, would not approve the
"compromise" proposal presented by the United States on this point.
Instead, on the final day, the Rome Statute was adopted without the U.S.
proposal, with 120 votes in favor, 7 against, and 21 abstentions.43 The
Court was created with an international community in mind and with the
goal of having the power to enforce penalties on those who violate its laws.
The transformation of the laws of the ICC occurred over time.
Following the finalization of the Rome Statute, the Preparatory
Commission was created to deal with remaining issues, such as the rules of
procedure and elements of crimes.44 It was this commission's work that set
the stage for the Court to officially come into being on July 1, 2002. The
next sections will review areas of the Rome Statute that continued to be of
importance to the Bush Administration.
2. Crimes Against Humanity
In addressing international law, the Rome Statute lays out a number of
crimes for which individuals may be brought before the Court. Under
Article 20 of the Draft Statute,45 four crimes were listed under general
international law:
1) Genocide;
2) Aggression;
3) Serious violations of the law and customs applicable in
armed conflict; and
4) Crimes against humanity.46
Article 7--Crimes Against Humanity-specifically lays out the laws
for which an individual may be brought before the ICC 47 for this category
42. Id. at 77. The former Bush Administration had since made a sustained effort to make
functional jurisdiction over U.S. citizens impossible. Jean Galbraith, Note, The Bush Administration's
Response to the International Criminal Court, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 683, 683 (2003); see also
Allison M. Danner, Navigating Law and Politics: The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court
and the Independent Counsel, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1633, 1633-34 (2003); McKay, supra note 35, at 464.
43. Kirsch & Robinson, supra note 41, at 71.
44. Philippe Kirsch & Valarie Oosterveld, The Post-Rome Conference Preparatory
Commission, in Volume , THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY 93, 93-104 (Antonio Cassese, et al. eds., Oxford University Press 2002).
45. Throughout this paper, "Article" refers to those Articles found in the Rome Statute.
46. Crawford, supra note 36, at 32.
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of crimes. Article 7 lists those crimes. For the purpose of this Statute,
"crime against humanity" means any of the following acts when committed
as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population, with knowledge of the attack:
(a) Murder;
(b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical
liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international
law;
(f) Torture;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of
sexual violence of comparable gravity;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender
as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are
universally recognized as impermissible under international
law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph
or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
(j) The crime of apartheid;
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to
mental or physical health.
48
Of the crimes listed above, the crime of torture 9 is of particular
interest to the United States. 50 Under the Rome Statute's provisions, there
47. See Mohamed E. Badar, From the Nuremberg Charter to the Rome Statute: Defining the
Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, 5 SAN DIEGO INTL L. J. 73, 90-91 (2004).
48. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 183/9 (July 17,
1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
49. According to the definition under Article 7(2)(e), "'Torture' means the intentional
infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under
the control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising only from,
inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions." Id. at 4.
50. According to an article by Shukovsky, recent developments regarding the abuse by U.S.
jailors at Guantanno Bay Naval Base in Cuba constitutes "torture" and (if proven true) are violations of
the U.N. Convention Against Torture. Paul Shukovsky, Terror Suspect's Suit Tells of US. Abuse:
Documents in Guantanamo Case Describe Extreme Isolation, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 6,
2004, at Al; see generally Diane M. Amann, Guantanamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNA'L L. 263 (2004).
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must be a clear mens rea"t that must include awareness by superior officers
that the particular criminal act is both widespread and systematic against a
civilian population. 2 This may be satisfied if in the course of a particular
crime, the attacker intended to pursue such an attack on a civilian
population. 3
The section on torture is broader than under customary international
law, as an international crime per se.14 The Court may punish a single act
of torture, even if the public authorities had no idea that the event was
taking place. 5 The issue of torture is important for the United States
because it is this category that could be used to bring one of its citizens
before the ICC, on account of U.S. government or military actions in
Afghanistan, the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba, 6 or in connection
with some future military involvement.
As one example, this article could be used against the United States as
a result of the calls for justice for the Afghan-war "detainees" at
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. 7 In contrast, there are limited chances that
the civilian U.S. legal system will prosecute any violations regarding the
extraction of information through questionable methods if such acts are
committed abroad. 8 However, it is possible for soldiers to be court
51. Antonio Cassese, Crimes against Humanity, in Volume I, THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 353, 363-65 (Antonio Cassese, et al. eds., Oxford
University Press 2002).
52. Id. at 373.
53. Id. at 354.
54. Id. at 374.
55. Id.
56. Katharine Q. Seelye, A Nation Challenged: Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2002, at A12;
Shukovsky, supra note 50.
57. See Seelye, supra note 56; Paisley Dodds, Four freedfrom Guantdnamo sue US., alleging
abuse, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 28, 2004, at AS. The article describes the pain that four detainees
suffered at the U.S. military base at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base on Cuba. It also goes on to state the
reasons for the $40 million suit ($10 million for each plaintiff). As the article notes:
The lawsuit alleges the four were chained to the floor while strobe lights and loud
music were played in a room chilled by air conditioning set at maximum levels.
The men say they were subjected to the conditions for up to 14 hours a day. They
say they were stripped naked and forced to watch videotapes of other prisoners
who had allegedly been ordered to sodomize each other ....
Id.
58. See Tim Golden, In US. Report, Brutal Details Of 2 Afghan Inmates" Deaths, N.Y. TIMES,
May 20, 2005, at Al, available at http-//www.nytimes.com (last visited July 20, 2009); see also
Katharine Q. Seelye, Threats and Responses: The Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2002, at A1 2.
20091
ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
marshalled for severe violations.5 9 It has been argued that the United States
has violated international laws in its treatment of those captured and held at
the base through the use of torture.60  Thus, it is not outside the realm of
possibility that an American soldier stationed at Guantanamo Bay Naval
Base could be brought before the ICC on the grounds of torture under
Article 7, if the military chooses not to prosecute that soldier.
In addition, the Supreme Court has held in Rasul v. United States "that
federal courts have jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the
detention of foreign nationals held at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base."
6
'
The question remains whether the Obama Administration will allow
challenges by the detainees to go forward in federal courts. It would seem
that absent any legal recourse in the U.S. justice system, ICC jurisdiction
might be invoked on the detainees' behalf.
As a practical matter, however, for this to occur, the Court would have
to gain jurisdiction over the soldier, which is highly unlikely. Nonetheless,
at the very least, court proceedings might be initiated, and the United States
could be faced with the difficult choice of either defending the soldier in a
court it has yet to recognize or simply ignoring the proceedings and hoping
that the soldier is never caught in an ICC member country. Furthermore, in
such an eventuality, the United States could be expected to use whatever
means necessary-including military force-in order to bring that soldier
back to the United States.
62
3. Jurisdiction
As the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base example demonstrates, the issue
of jurisdiction will be central for the Obama Administration should a U.S.
59. The U.S. soldiers being charged in a military court for crimes of torture of prisoners at the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba is one example. See Kate Zemike, At Abuse Hearing, No Testimony
That G.l's Acted on Orders, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7,2004, at A7.
60. See Seelye, supra note 56, at Al; Shukovsky, supra note 50.
61. Rasul v. United States, 542 U.S. 466, 486 (2004) (quoting Kennedy, J., concurring); see
also Linda Greenhouse, Justices Affirm Legal Rights of 'Enemy Combatants', N.Y. TIMES, June 29,
2004, at Al.
62. See The American Servicemembers Protection Act, 22 U.S.C.§ 7421 (2003). This act
specifically addresses U.S. Servicemembers who might be brought before the ICC. Section (8) states:
Members of the Armed Forces of the United States should be free from the risk of
prosecution by the International Criminal Court, especially when they are
stationed or deployed around the world to protect the vital national interests of the
United States. The United States Government has an obligation to protect the
members of its Armed Forces, to the maximum extent possible, against criminal
prosecutions carried out by the International Criminal Court.
Id. (italics added); see also McKay, supra note 35, at 464.
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citizen ever face the ICC. It is only after jurisdiction is acquired and the
ICC has the accused in its custody that the prosecution of that individual
may actually begin. As Crawford points out, a major change made during
the process of revising the Rome Statute was the deletion of the reference to
existing international criminal law treaties that would have allowed greater
access to the accused. He further notes, "[i]t is remarkable that a text which
began its life eschewing any reliance upon customary international law as a
basis for defining crimes ... should end up by excluding any reference to
the other treaties at all."63
By taking a closer look at the issue of ICC jurisdiction, a fuller
understanding of the difficulties that may arise for the U.S. government
may be gained. This section will now turn to the articles themselves in
order to better understand how, specifically, the ICC might gain jurisdiction
over a U.S. citizen.
To begin, when President Bush effectively annulled Clinton's
signature, the Court's jurisdiction over U.S. citizens became far more
limited. This is because, according to Article 11, the Court can have
automatic jurisdiction only over those who are signatories of the Court.
Article 12 notes this very limitation and lays out the preconditions to the
exercise ofjurisdiction:
1.A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts
the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crimes
referred to in article 5.
2.In the case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may
exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the following
States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the
jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with paragraph 3:
(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in
question occurred or, if the crime was committed on
board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of
that vessel or aircraft;
(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is
a national.
3. If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute
is required under paragraph 2, that State may, by
declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in
question. The accepting State shall cooperate with the
63. Crawford, supra note 36, at 33.
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Court without any delay or exception in accordance with
Part 9. 6
4
There are thus two basic ways that jurisdiction can be gained: first,
according to Article 1 2(2)(b), if the accused is a citizen of an ICC signatory
country; 65 and second, if the crime was committed within the territory of a
country that is a State Party to the Rome Statute, regardless of the
nationality of the perpetrator.6 6 In effect, therefore, the United States
managed to limit but not to completely eliminate ICC jurisdiction over its
citizens when it unsigned the Statute. Frulli gives a solid summary of this
issue:
[O]nly individuals who are nationals of State Parties who have
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, may be tried irrespective of
the circumstances in which the crime was allegedly committed,
whereas nationals of States who did not accept it [e.g., the United
States] can be prosecuted only if charged with the commission of
crimes in the territory of a State who accepts the ICC jurisdiction
or in a situation which has been deferred to the Court by the
Security Council under Article 1367
Thus, U.S. citizens can clearly be brought before the ICC under Article
12(2)(a) if they are accused of crimes committed on the territory of a
signatory to the Court. As Frulli's summary notes, the only other condition
under which a U.S. citizen could theoretically be brought before the ICC is
with a U.N. Security Council recommendation via Article 13, which reads,
The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime
referred to in article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this
Statute if:
(a) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to
have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a
State Party in accordance with article 14;
(b) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to
have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the
Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of
the United Nations; or
64. Rome Statute, supra note 48, at art. 12.
65. Micaela Frulli, Jurisdiction Ratione Personae, in Volume L, THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 527, 535 (Antonio Cassese, et al. eds., Oxford
University Press 2002).
66. Id.
67. Id.
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(c) The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect of
such a crime in accordance with article 15.68
In other words, Article 13(b) would allow the U.N. Security Council to
recommend that a U.S. citizen be brought before the Court regardless of
where a crime had been committed. As a practical matter, however, it is
highly doubtful that the United States would ever turn one of its citizens
over to this Court, even if that person has clearly committed a crime. 69 It
can be assumed, however, that the United States-particularly under the
Bush Administration-would have used its veto power rather than allow the
U.N. Security Council to recommend the prosecution of a U.S. national.
Furthermore, even if a U.S. citizen commits a crime on the soil of a
signatory to the Court, that country will not likely be allowed to bring the
U.S. citizen before the ICC. To begin, the United States is party to a
number of extradition treaties with countries throughout the world.7°
Extradition enables the United States to transfer persons from its soil to the
country in which they are wanted, to stand trial there for criminal acts, and
vice versa. 71  Therefore, if a country has a valid reason for wishing to
prosecute a U.S. citizen for a criminal act that the Administration
recognizes, it is much more likely that the United States would hand the
person over to the jurisdiction of a country that had agreed not to turn the
accused over to the ICC-although even then extradition would move along
at the same glacial pace it had in modem times.
The difficulty comes, however, should the United States refuse to
comply with an extradition request, as might be the case when the citizen
that is being requested by the Court serves in the Armed Forces of the
United States or is working for the U.S. government. If the crime is torture,
the U.S. government may be particularly unwilling to hand that individual
68. Rome Statute, supra note 48, at art. 13.
69. See 22 U.S.C. § 742 1, supra note 62.
70. Specifically, the United States has used its threat to cut off foreign aid-especially military
aid-to any country that does not agree to immunize United States' citizens from prosecution via the
ICC through bilateral agreements. See Alisha D. Telci, Note, The International Criminal Court: Is the
United States Overlooking an Easier Way to Hold Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden Accountable
for their Actions?, 38 NEw ENG. L. REv. 451, 451-54 (2004). See also Paul J. Toner, Competing
Concepts of Immunity: The (R)evolution of the Head of State Immunity Defense, 108 PENN ST. L. REV.
899 (2004). Toner states, "Pierre-Richard Prosper, the United States War Crimes Envoy, continually
warns nations that they risk losing foreign aid if they do not grant United States citizens, officials, and
military personnel immunity from the ICC." Id. at 900 (summarizing Peter Slevin, War Crimes Envoy
Gets Face-to-Face To Make His Case; State Dept. Office Sets Sights on Iraqis, THE WASHINGTON POST,
Oct. 30, 2002, at A21).
71. See United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567 (1 th Cir. 1995), cited in JORDAN J. PAUST ET
AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S. 501 (West Group 2000).
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over for extradition. If the U.S. justice system then fails to prosecute that
person in a U.S. court, the ICC can hold that the legal system in the United
States has failed to function properly and that the person can therefore be
brought before the ICC.72 Under Article 90(7), a request for extradition by
a State Party (an ICC signatory nation) shall be given priority over
extradition requests from non-signatories. In other words, for instance,
should one country ask for extradition of a criminal currently held by
another country, the ICC request would take priority. Article 90 states,
Where a State Party which receives a request from the Court for
the surrender of a person also receives a request from any State
for the extradition of the same person for conduct other than that
which constitutes the crime for which the Court seeks the
person's surrender:
(a) The requested State shall, if it is not under an existing
international obligation to extradite the person to the
requesting State, give priority to the request from the Court;
(b) The requested State shall, if it is under an existing
international obligation to extradite the person to the
requesting State, determine whether to surrender the person
to the Court or to extradite the person to the requesting
State. In making its decision, the requested State shall
consider all the relevant factors, including but not limited to
those set out in paragraph 6, but shall give special
consideration to the relative nature and gravity of the
conduct in question.
73
Thus, under Article 90(7), if a U.S. citizen wanted by a State Party is
captured and arrested in a country that is a signatory to the ICC, then that
Member State is obligated to turn the person over to the ICC to face trial for
crimes as listed by the Rome Statute.
It is possible, though unlikely, that the Bush Administration would
accept the ICC's jurisdiction, which is provided for under Article 12(3). 74
The non-Party State, in this case the United States, is then expected to
cooperate with the Court. In this situation, however, the rights of the
accused would almost certainly be an issue for the Administration.
72. Gennady M. Danilenko, ICC Statute and Third States, in Volume H, THE ROME STATUTE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1871, 1888 (Antonio Cassese, et al. eds.,
Oxford University Press 2002).
73. Rome Statute, supra note 48, at art. 90.
74. See Danilenko, supra note 72, at 1889-90.
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4. Rights of the Defendant
Given that in the future a U.S. citizen may be brought before the
Court, the question here is whether an accused can receive a fair trial. Kay
notes that the ICC only mentions defense council in passing, and only then
on the assumption that the defendant chooses not to represent him or
herself.75 As they also point out, a weak defense council going up against a
very strong prosecution-a situation that would tip the balance toward the
prosecution even before the trial begins-will undercut the credibility of the
76Rome Statute in the eyes of the international community. Article 67(l)(d)
outlines the rights of the accused to legal assistance and related guarantees:
Subject to article 63, paragraph 2, to be present at the trial, to
conduct the defense in person or through legal assistance of the
accused's choosing, to be informed, if the accused does not have
legal assistance, of this right and to have legal assistance assigned
by the Court in any case where the interests of justice so require,
and without payment if the accused lacks sufficient means to pay
for it.
77
In practice, however, the defense may be subjected at the very least to
ridicule, or worse, violence for assisting people who are accused of
committing some of the worst crimes imaginable against humanity. There
will be problems when the defense goes into the country where the crimes
were supposed to have taken place in order to gather information.78 In the
face of public or institutional hostility in the place where the crime was
alleged to have occurred, the defense's ability to gather the evidence
necessary to clear an accused person may be hampered.
In sum, the defense is marginalized as compared to the prosecution.79
For this reason, the Bush Administration may have been justified in
questioning whether the Court may provide a fair trial, especially if it brings
a U.S. citizen before it for alleged crimes of torture. Assuming that a trial
actually takes place, what could an accused expect in terms of procedures?
75. Steven Kay, The Role of the Defence, in Volume II, THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, 1421, 1421 (Antonio Cassese, et al. eds., Oxford
University Press 2002).
76. See id. at 1422-23.
77. Rome Statute, supra note 48, at art. 67.
78. Kay, supra note 75, at 1424-25.
79. Id. at 1430.
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5. Trial
The trial is conducted in the presence of three judges and without a
jury.80 Therefore, there is a noted difference, between the U.S. legal system
and that of the Court's. The U.S. Constitution Article III, Section 2, Clause
3, guarantees that trial of crimes shall be by jury. The defendant in an ICC
trial does, however, have certain other rights. First, Article 66 states that
there is a presumption of innocence:
1) Everyone shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty
before the Court in accordance with the applicable law.
2) The onus is on the Prosecutor to prove the guilt of the
accused.
3) In order to convict the accused, the Court must be
convinced of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt."'
Then the prosecution must convince two of the three judges that the
accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Zappala adds that this right
has become part of customary international law concerning the
administration of criminal justice.82 An accused shall be found innocent if
the prosecution cannot prove guilt of the crimes of which he or she has been
accused beyond a reasonable doubt.83 What is considered reasonable,
however, remains up to the three judges to decide. Furthermore, as
discussed above, the problem here under the Court rules is that the
prosecution has a major advantage as compared to the defense.84  The
advantages of the prosecution may bias the judges against the accused. The
judges may also be biased against a defendant who chooses to remain silent
at trial, although the right not to testify is guaranteed. According to Article
67(g), the accused has the right "[n]ot to be compelled to testify or to
confess guilt and to remain silent, without such silence being a
consideration in the determination of guilt or innocence.' '4 5 As a practical
80. Frank Terrier, Powers of the Trial Chamber, in Volume 11, THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, 1259, 1260 (Antonio Cassese, et al. eds., Oxford
University Press 2002) (interpreting Rome Statute, supra note 48, at art. 39).
81. Rome Statute, supra note 48, at art. 66.
82. Salvatore Zappala, The Rights of the Accused, in Volume I, THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, 1319, 1341 (Antonio Cassese, et al. eds., Oxford
University Press 2002).
83. Rome Statute, supra note 48, at art. 66; Zappala, supra note 82.
84. Kay, supra note 75, at 1430.
85. Rome Statute, supra note 48, at art. 67.
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matter, however, here as in U.S. courts, the judges may be prejudiced
against an accused who refuses to testify.
Other rights of the defendant include the right to be informed by the
prosecution and the court's obligation to ensure that the accused
understands the charges against him or her, 6 as listed under Articles
67(l)(a) to (i), respectively. 7  Certainly, the rights of the accused are
strengthened under the Rome Statute, as compared to the ad hoc military
tribunals of the recent past, especially as it relates to the assumption of
innocence.88 Yet, as Zappala points out, there is no way to sanction
violations of the rights of the accused.89  This is one area that could be
strengthened within the Rome Statute.90
There is in fact the general assurance of a "fair trial" under Article
67(1), which states, "In the determination of any charge, the accused shall
be entitled to a public hearing, having regard to the provisions of this
86. Zappala, supra note 82, at 1349.
87. Articles 67(1)(a) to (i) of the Rome Statute state that an accused has the right:
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail of the nature, cause and content of the
charge, in a language which the accused fully understands and speaks; (b) To
have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence and to
communicate freely with counsel of the accused's choosing in confidence; (c) To
be tried without undue delay; (d) Subject to article 63, paragraph 2, to be present
at the trial, to conduct the defence in person or through legal assistance of the
accused's choosing, to be informed, if the accused does not have legal assistance,
of this right and to have legal assistance assigned by the Court in any case where
the interests of justice so require, and without payment if the accused lacks
sufficient means to pay for it; (e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses
against him or her and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on
his or her behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him or her. The
accused shall also be entitled to raise defences and to present other evidence
admissible under this Statute; (f) To have, free of any cost, the assistance of a
competent interpreter and such translations as are necessary to meet the
requirements of fairness, if any of the proceedings of or documents presented to
the Court are not in a language which the accused fully understands and speaks;
(g) Not to be compelled to testify or to confess guilt and to remain silent, without
such silence being a consideration in the determination of guilt or innocence; (h)
To make an unswom oral or written statement in his or her defence; and (i) Not to
have imposed on him or her any reversal of the burden of proof or any onus of
rebuttal.
Rome Statute, supra note 48, at art. 66-67.
88. Zappala, supra note 82, at 1353.
89. Id. at 1353-54.
90. Id.
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Statute, to a fair hearing conducted impartially .... , Yet as Zappala
points out, such fairness is not assured.
92
In conclusion, the rights of the accused are in many ways similar to
those found in the U.S. courts, including in areas of evidence, witnesses,
and the right to gather information from the prosecution. The major
difference is the lack of a jury, which by itself may cause U.S. citizens and
politicians to question whether the ICC trial offers a truly authentic process.
In the event that a U.S. citizen has been tried and been found guilty, the
next question is the type of sentence he or she might receive from the ICC.
6. Sentencing of the Accused
The sentence shall be read out to the accused and made public.93 All
deliberations of the Court regarding the accused, including those regarding
sentences are, however, carried out in secret. In addition, the articles allow
for a simple majority to be reached, i.e., two of the three judges,94 for a
sentence to be given.95 The rules are laid out in Article 74, which states,
1.All the judges of the Trial Chamber shall be present at each
stage of the trial and throughout their deliberations. The
Presidency [of the Court] may, on a case-by-case basis,
designate, as available, one or more alternate judges to be
present at each stage of the trial and to replace a member of
the Trial Chamber if that member is unable to continue
attending.
2.The Trial Chamber's decision shall be based on its evaluation
of the evidence and the entire proceedings. The decision
shall not exceed the facts and circumstances described in
the charges and any amendments to the charges. The Court
may base its decision only on evidence submitted and
discussed before it at the trial.
3. The judges shall attempt to achieve unanimity in their decision,
failing which the decision shall be taken by a majority of
the judges.
4.The deliberations of the Trial Chamber shall remain secret.
91. Rome Statute, supra note 48, at art. 67.
92. Zappala, supra note 82, at 1348.
93. Article 76(4) states, "The sentence shall be pronounced in public and, whenever possible,
in the presence of the accused." Rome Statute, supra note 48, at art. 76.
94. See Rome Statute, supra note 48, at art. 39(2)(b)(ii), art. 74(3)
95. Frank Terrier, The Procedure before the Trial Chamber, in Volume II, THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, 1277, 1314 (Antonio Cassese,
et al. eds., Oxford University Press 2002).
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5.The decision shall be in writing and shall contain a full and
reasoned statement of the Trial Chamber's findings on the
evidence and conclusions. The Trial Chamber shall issue
one decision. When there is no unanimity, the Trial
Chamber's decision shall contain the views of the majority
and the minority. The decision or a summary thereof shall
be delivered in open court. 96
Although the secrecy of the deliberations is consistent with many
courts of law in the United States, again, for a person to be convicted in a
criminal trial in the United States, typically the jury must rule on the guilty
verdict by a unanimous vote. In contrast, because all it takes is two people
to mete out sentences that may be substantial, the "fairness" of the trial may
be questioned by those accustomed to the U.S. judicial system.
Furthermore, as Terrier points out, the judges may hold the person
guilty and sentence the accused in one sitting.97 In this way, a simple
majority of two can in effect act as both "judge and jury." The U.S. courts
may grant this power in cases involving minor criminal infractions, but
never for major crimes, including those egregious crimes against persons
such as murder. This particular weakness of ICC procedures could become
an issue if the one dissenting judge offers a severe criticism of either the
verdict or the sentence in private and that opinion is somehow made public.
In fact the minority judge's opinion would as a matter of course be
published.98
Possible sentences imposed by ICC judges can be very hard, as
illustrated by Article 77:
1.Subject to article 110, the Court may impose one of the
following penalties on a person convicted of a crime
referred to in article 5 of this Statute:
(a) Imprisonment for a specified number of years, which
may not exceed a maximum of 30 years; or
(b) A term of life imprisonment when justified by the
extreme gravity of the crime and the individual
circumstances of the convicted person.
2. In addition to imprisonment, the Court may order:
(a) A fine under the criteria provided for in the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence;
96. Rome Statute, supra note 48, at art. 74.
97. Terrier, supra note 95, at 1317.
98. Rome Statute, supra note 48, at art. 74. Article 74(5) states, in part, "When there is no
unanimity, the Trial Chamber's decision shall contain the views of the majority and the minority. The
decision or a summary thereof shall be delivered in open court." Id. (italics added).
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(b) A forfeiture of proceeds, property and assets derived
directly or indirectly from that crime, without
prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties.9
To sentence a person to life, impose a substantial fine, and then take
away their property is admittedly an extreme case, but it is not out of the
realm of possibility. Arguably, such a sentence may be appropriate for
those whose crimes deserve such severe punishment. In any case, it is hard
to predict how the U.S. public or the current Obama Administration will
react to a severe punishment meted by the Court to an American defendant.
The final issue that this section will address is appeals.
7. Appeals
Following sentencing by the ICC, a U.S. citizen would be allowed to
appeal. The appeal, however, is not de novo to the Appeals Chamber under
Article 81(1), though the Court may hear additional evidence.1° This
process is similar to U.S. courts of appeal that may or may not review cases
de novo, depending upon the issue at hand. Article 81(1) states in part,
(b) The convicted person, or the Prosecutor on that person's
behalf, may make an appeal on any of the following
grounds:
(i) Procedural error,
(ii) Error of fact,
(iii) Error of law, or
(iv) Any other ground that affects the fairness or reliability of
the proceedings or decision.
101
The convicted individual's rights to appeal are therefore similar to
those in U.S. courts. The decision may be affirmed, reversed, or
amended. 102 Indeed, the accused once sentenced, as well the prosecutor,
has broad discretion to make an appeal. However, in contrast to the many
levels of U.S. courts, the defendant convicted in an ICC proceeding has
only one additional level to appeal to, the Appeals Chamber, whose
decision becomes final.
99. Id. at art. 77.
100. Alphons Orie, Accusatorial v. Inquisitorial Approach in International Criminal
Proceedings Prior to the Establishment of the ICC and in the Proceedings Before the ICC, in Volume II,
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, 1439, 1491
(Antonio Cassese, et al. eds., Oxford University Press 2002).
101. Rome Statute, supra note 48, at art. 81.
102. One, supra note 100, at 1491.
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Another potentially controversial issue resides in the fact that the
Appeals Chamber is also part of the same legal structure; accordingly, it
may be questioned whether it would be at all likely to reverse a decision by
their fellow ICC judges. As Orie states, though the right to appeal is very
broad, the Appeals Chamber might look more like a "common-law"
appellate court,'0 3 where few reversals might be expected. Thus, despite the
generally broad discretion to appeal, there appears to be a smaller likelihood
that a conviction will be overturned in the ICC than in the U.S. criminal
justice system.
In summary, while the Rome Statute offers many advantages for the
accused, it may significantly also disadvantage those who are prosecuted
under it. This section has reviewed the process by which a U.S. citizen
might be convicted and tried before the ICC. It has been shown that a basic
argument could be made for the bringing of a U.S. citizen before the Court
for the purpose of charging him or her for the crime of torture under Article
7(l)()04 of the Rome Statute for alleged crimes at the Guantanamo Bay
Naval Base, in Iraq, in Afghanistan, or in some other country. For this to
occur, however, the Court would first have to gain jurisdiction over that
person, which may be all but impossible if he or she is residing in the
United States or is under the protection of either the United States or one of
its allies. However, if the accused is apprehended in a country that is a
signatory to the ICC, then under Article 90(7)105 that person could, in
theory, be brought before the ICC. Of course, whether the Obama
Administration would allow this to occur is an unanswered question.
III. FORMER PRESIDENT BUSH AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
Few events have changed an Administration's perspective more than
did the attacks of September 11, 2001. In their aftermath, the focus has
shifted from domestic issues to fighting terrorism around the globe. In the
process, the former Bush Administration put itself squarely in the
international arena, thereby opening itself to examination and even
condemnation.
The previous Administration's continued aggressiveness toward the
lingering Iraqi resistance caused by "insurgents" and its "war on
terrorism,"'1 6 has resulted in increased negative feelings toward the United
States, and President Bush in particular, around the world due to its
103. Id.
104. Rome Statute, supra note 48, at art. 7.
105. Id. at art. 90.
106. See Robert M. Entman, Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and
Foreign Policy 1-3 (The University of Chicago Press 2004).
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preemptive doctrine and "aggressive unilateralism."' 7 Simultaneously, the
Bush Administration continued its fight against the existence of the ICC.1
08
With these combined actions, the possibility of U.S. citizens being brought
before the ICC has increased, as populations of various countries have
called on their leaders to oppose the former Bush Administration. This
anti-U.S. sentiment has only increased with the treatment of prisoners in
Afghanistan and at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, 10 9 and because of
continuing civilian casualties caused by the U.S. military and other U.S.
operatives, e.g., the CIA in Iraq and elsewhere.
A. Foreign Policy
The Bush Administration came into power with a clear wish to reshape
the United States. Part of that change was due to an event that forever
changed the lives of so many. September 11 had a major impact on
President Bush; although he started the day in a typical if not casual
manner, 110 the day's events, according to Bruni, hit President Bush like
nothing before in his presidency."' Nine days after the attack, President
Bush told Congress and the American people:
On September 11 th, the enemies of freedom committed an act of
war against our country. Americans have known wars-but for
the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except
for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of
war-but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning.
Americans have known surprise attacks-but never before on
thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a
single day-and night fell on a different world, a world where
freedom is under attack."1
2
107. Seyom Brown, The Illusion of Control: Force and Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First
Century 43 (Brookings Institute Press 2003).
108. See John Lumpkin, U.S. threatened by international egal challenges as well as terrorism,
Pentagon says, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 18, 2005. The article notes that the Bush Administration
"vehemently" opposes the ICC.
109. Douglas Jehl, U.S. Rules on Prisoners Seen as a Back and Forth of Mixed Messages to
G.I.'s, N.Y. TIMEs, June 22, 2004, at A7.
110. Frank Bruni, Ambling into History, The Unlikely Odyssey of George W. Bush 1, 2
(HarperCollins 2002).
I11. See id. at 247.
112. George W. Bush, Enemies of Freedom Committed an Act of War Against America, in The
Attack on America: September 11, 2001 10 (William Dudley ed., Greenhaven Press 2002).
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In the new, post-September 11 world, President Bush would seek a
broad coalition to root out "terrorism,"'" 3 as his focus shifted to
international affairs, 14 though more recently, the shift had once-again gone
back to such domestic issues as social security reform and making his tax
cuts permanent. The Administration's change of direction both at home
and abroad, while supported by many Americans, forced the international
community to come to grips with a more "hands-on" President determined
to see the United States lead the world and willing to intervene abroad. As
an editorial by the Harvard Law Review notes:
In terms of foreign policy, then, September 11 has changed the
American approach to terrorism from one of multilateral
negotiation, recourse to international institutions, and recognition
of equality among sister states to one of unilateral development
and enunciation of policy to be executed jointly-by military
force if necessary-by the United States and its allies. 
115
President Bush's foreign-policy response to the attacks has been
described as "masterful."' 1 6 Indeed, September 11 galvanized the support
of the American public in ways formerly seen in more traditional wars.
1 17
With the passing of time, however, that support has been eroded as
casualties caused by U.S. personnel have mounted, the rise of insurgent
attacks causing more death in Iraq, and with abuse of prisoners by U.S.
soldiers. Hostility'" towards American actions at home and abroad, even
before U.S.-led forces attacked Iraq in March 1993, made the international
environment even more troublesome for the Bush Administration, in the
sense that fewer nations have been willing to go along with the wishes of
the current superpower.
To summarize, the Bush Administration had chosen to focus on the
global war on terrorism. In the process, it had increased the military budget
113. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Lessons from the Balkans for American Foreign Policy: Building
Civil Society within a Multilateral Framework, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 229, 229 (2002).
114. Stanley A. Renshon, The World According to George W. Bush: Good Judgment or
Cowboy Politics?, in GOOD JUDGMENT IN FOREIGN POLICY: THEORY AND APPLICATION 271, 278
(Stanley A. Renshon & Deborah W. Larson eds., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2003).
115. Note, Responding to Terrorism: Crime, Punishment, and War, 115 HARv. L. REv. 1217,
1228 (2002).
116. See Renshon, supra note 114, at 301.
117. ENTMAN, supra note 106, at 1-4.
118. Edieth Y. Wu, Saddam Hussein as Hostess Humani Generis? Should the US. Intervene?,
26 SYRACUSE J. INTL L. & COM. 55 (1998). Wu argues that hostility toward U.S. actions is being
expressed on many fronts throughout the world community. Id. at 86.
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and had chosen to take a more aggressive strategy in its attempt to eradicate
the terrorists who operate both on U.S. soil and abroad. Furthermore, it
used that goal as an argument in Iraq. In so doing, the Bush Administration
may have been crossing the limits of what much of the world consider
acceptable levels of intervention by the reigning world superpower;" 9 not
to mention that it is widely believed to be using terrorism as an excuse for
military adventures, e.g., the restructuring of the Iraqi regime.
B. The International Criminal Court
Former President Bush had clearly stated his distrust of the ICC,120 and
his Administration was squarely in the camp of the opposition to the
Court.'2' Since the beginning of his presidency, President Bush has
consistently opposed the ICC. On July 2, 2002, President Bush said,
The International Criminal Court is troubling to the United
States. It's troubling to the Administration and obviously trouble
with the United States Senate as well.
President Clinton signed this treaty, but when he signed it, he
said it should not be submitted to the Senate. It therefore never
has been, and I don't intend to submit it either, because it-you
know, as the United States works to bring peace around the
world, our diplomats and our soldiers could be drug into this
Court, and that's a very troubling-very troubling to me.
And we'll try to work out the impasse at the United Nations. But
one thing we're not going to do is sign on to the International
Criminal Court. 1
22
On July 19, 2002, the President told the 10th Mountain Division at
Fort Drum, New York,
You might have heard about a treaty that would place American
troops under the jurisdiction of something called the International
Criminal Court. The United States cooperates with many other
nations to keep the peace, but we will not submit American
119. Michael Hirsh, At War with Ourselves: Why America is Squandering Its Change to Build
a Better World 175-76 (Oxford University Press 2003).
120. George W. Bush's Exchange With Reporters in Milwaukee, Wis., 1 PUB. PAPERS 1161
(July 8, 2002) (hereinafter Milwaukee).
121. See Worth, supra note 13, at 245-46.
122. Milwaukee, supra note 120.
[Vol. 16:1
Schaefer
troops to prosecutors and judges whose jurisdiction we do not
accept. 
23
President Bush said on October 8, 2004, in his first presidential debate
with Senator John Kerry (D-Massachusetts),
I made a decision not to join the International Criminal Court in The
Hague, which is where our troops could be brought to-brought in front of
a judge, an unaccounted judge.
I don't think we ought to join that. That was unpopular.
And so, what I'm telling you is, is that sometimes in this world
you make unpopular decisions because you think they're right.
We'll continue to reach out.
Listen, there is 30 nations involved in Iraq, some 40 nations
involved in Afghanistan.
People love America. Sometimes they don't like the decisions
made by America, but I don't think you want a president who
tries to become popular and does the wrong thing.
You don't want to join the International Criminal Court just
because it's popular in certain capitals in Europe.
124
Thus, former President Bush had continued his opposition to the ICC,
even if that means going against world opinion in favor of the Court. His
position is shared by many current and former members of the White
House, notably Henry Kissinger, who in a recent book questions the power
given to ICC prosecutors as well as their ability to use unbiased discretion
in bringing Americans before the Court.
125
Indeed, the involvement of nations who might be likely to bring U.S.
citizens or agents before the Court continued to be a primary reason that the
former Bush Administration resisted the Court's power to prosecute without
123. George W. Bush's Remarks to the Tenth Mountain Division at Fort Drum, N.Y. 2 PuB.
PAPERS 1270 (July 22, 2002).
124. Transcript Part 1: Candidates tackle Iraq, CNN, available at
http://edition.cnn.coml2004/ALLPOLITICS/10/08/debate.transcriptindex.html (last visited on October
8, 2009) [hereinafter Transcript Part I].
125. HENRY KISSINGER, DOES AMERICA NEED A FOREIGN POLICY? TOWARD A DIPLOMACY
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 281-82 (Simon & Schuster 2001). See also Cassandra Jeu, A Successful,
Permanent International Criminal Court. "Isn't it Pretty to Think so? ", 26 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 411, 438-
39 (2004).
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U.N. Security Council's authorization. The basic argument is that military
tribunals in which the United States has historically had a major influence
are a far better route.
26
This profound distrust of the ICC will determine how this Obama
Administration proceeds once the Court begins to bring individuals,
especially U.S. citizens, before it for prosecution for war crimes. The
question is how far the Administration will go in order to protect not only
members of the Armed Forces of the United States and U.S. citizens, 27 but
those of its allies as well. It is also unclear how the Obama Administration
might react if, in the context of a war, it finds itself in the position where a
U.S. citizen has committed an act that could in theory be prosecuted by the
ICC. Even with support from Britain and a permanent seat on the U.N.
Security Council, the stakes have been raised within the world community,
which has increasingly taken a more anti-American view as a direct result
of the former Bush Administration's handling of U.S. foreign affairs. 28 As
will be argued in the next section, this negative viewpoint will increase the
likelihood that a U.S. citizen will be brought before the ICC.
IV. THE FORMER BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND WORLD OPINION
Two contrasting views will be explored within this section. The first is
the view of the world according to former President Bush, and the second is
the world's view of former President Bush. The image of the world (and in
particular Iraq) projected by President Bush in his statements to the media
exerted a powerful influence on domestic politics. 129 This image in turn
was picked up by public-opinion polls that attempt to gauge the effect of the
President's message. 130  The message that the President received back
through these polls may then have affected the direction taken by the
Administration. Thus, the first challenge for the Bush Administration was
to get the "right" message out to the American public, that is, the one
conveying the Administration's view of the world. This is especially
important regarding the ICC, and the former Administration's opposition to
its status as a world court.
126. Kenneth Anderson, What to do with Bin Laden and AL Quad Terrorists?: A Qualified
Defense of Military Commissions and United States Policy on Detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval
Base, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY 591, 600-603 (2002).
127. See 22 U.S.C. § 7421.
128. Richard Morin, World Image of US. Declines, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 5, 2002, at A26.
129. See Entman, supra note 106, at 1-3.
130. Crespi notes that one of the major criticisms of public opinion polls is that they in turn
affect the political life of those involved, e.g., the politicians. IRVING CRESPI, PUBLIC OPINION POLLS,
AND DEMOCRACY 2 (westview Press 1989).
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A. President Bush's View
Former President Bush has tended to use the term world opinion to
mean the common viewpoint of United States and the rest of the world.
When, however, the President wishes to get across the United States'
resolve to "go it alone," he has made it a point in his speeches to project the
Administration's position on such subjects as the war with Iraq. In this
case, the use of the collective pronouns "we," "our," and "us" refers only to
the United States. This tactic conveys that the United States speaks with
one voice in foreign policy, and that this voice belongs to the President.
131
In this way, President Bush was both projecting his own image as the
nation's leader, speaking for its foreign policies, and implicitly asserting
that the rest of the world should follow.
132
The President through the media can influence the U.S. public through
such media as The N.Y. Times and CNN; furthermore, he may also even be
able to more indirectly influence public opinion abroad. In addition, his
strategic use of the media to convey his worldview can ensure that
Congress will award foreign aid to selected countries and thereby influence
those nations. As Gaddis argues, "President George W. Bush's national
security strategy could represent the most sweeping shift in U.S. grand
strategy since the beginning of the Cold War. But its success depends on
the willingness of the rest of the world to welcome U.S. power with open
11133
arms. He adds that President Bush planned to maintain the United
States as the world hegemon at any cost. 134  The position of the United
States as the undisputed world leader in terms of military strength, and to a
lesser extent political leadership, might seem to allow him to push the views
131. Cleveland argues that such a voice is a myth, stating, however, that "the requirement of a
unified voice in foreign relations has emerged from two related lines of doctrine: the principle that
states are excluded from international relations, and the assumption that the President speaks as a soloist
for the United States." Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the "One Voice" Myth in US. Foreign
Relations, 46 VILL. L. REv. 975, 982 (2001). Cleveland notes that the Supreme Court has upheld this
"one-voice" belief. Id. at 975.
132. The thesis of Foyle's book is that:
[A] decision-maker's reaction to public opinion is based on the interaction
between the person's beliefs about the proper role of public opinion in
formulating foreign policy and the prevailing decision context. My findings
suggest that some individuals' beliefs make them relatively open to decisions
responding to public opinion, whereas others' beliefs cause them to ignore the
public's view when contemplating foreign policy choices.
Douglas C. Foyle, Counting the Public In: Presidents, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy 2 (Columbia
University Press, 1999).
133. John L. Gaddis, A Grand Strategy, FOREIGN AFFAIRS; Nov/Dec. 2002, at 50.
134. See id. at 52-53.
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of his Administration onto the rest of the world. Indeed, the position of the
United States as the world's hegemon is especially important to the issue of
the ICC135 versus military tribunals because many nations may openly
support the U.S. position, even if they do not necessary agree with it.
President Bush-as the world leader-had continued to push for
tribunals as an alternative to the ICC.' 36 He did so with the clear goal of
influencing world opinion. The question is whether the rest of the world
was getting his message. A message given when there is an increasingly
negative world opinion directed at the United States due to the failure to
find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the treatment of prisoners in
Afghanistan and at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, and the continued
civilian casualties caused by the U.S. military and civilian operatives in Iraq
and elsewhere. The next section of this paper will attempt to answer this
question by looking at how the rest of the world views the United States
and specifically the former Bush Administration.
B. World Opinion
International public opinion changes with time and with the flow of
world events. 37 Individuals such as former President Bush gamer "global
reputations," whether fair or unfair, as representatives of the United
States. 138 As discussed above, the prestige of the United States has declined
since President Bush entered office. This is due in part to the treatment of
prisoners at the hands of U.S. soldiers139 as well as to the continued strife of
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 140 This decline is seen in the data contained
135. SeeHirsh, supranote 119, at 176.
136. See George W. Bush's Exchange With Reporters in Alexandria, Va., 1 PUB. PAPERS 458
(March 25, 2002).
137. Frank L. Rusciano, World Opinion and the Emerging International Order 159, 165 (Frank
L. Rusciano ed., Praeger 1998).
138. See id. at 167.
139. Eric Schmitt & Kate Zernike, U.S. Charges an Australian with Fighting for Taliban, N.Y.
TIMES, June 10, 2004, at A12.
140. Edieth Y. Wu, Global Responses and Recourses to Terrorism, 25 WHITTIER L. REv. 521,
555-56 (2004). See also Transcript Part I, supra note 124. President Bush acknowledged during the
debate with Senator Kerry:
You know, I've made some decisions on Israel that's unpopular. I wouldn't deal
with Arafat, because I felt like he had let the former president down, and I don't
think he's the kind of person that can lead toward a Palestinian state. And people
in Europe didn't like that decision. And that was unpopular, but it was the right
thing to do.
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in surveys conducted by The Pew Research Center for the People & the
Press (Pew). 14' These show the extent to which the U.S. image abroad has
slipped during President Bush's early tenure. This decline continued,
according a report released on June 6, 2003, by Pew: "[Flavorable opinions
of the U.S. have slipped in nearly every country for which trend measures
are available.' 42  According to a poll by Pew from March 16, 2004, this
trend has only gotten worse: "A year after the war in Iraq, discontent with
America and its policies has intensified rather than diminish.' 43 President
Bush's reelection disappointed many within the international community.'
44
This trend should be a serious concern to both President Obama and those
in Congress, for it is negative world opinion toward the United States and
its policies that may ultimately lead to a U.S. citizen being brought before
the ICC.
These findings indicate that the image of the United States abroad
continues to slip. This includes, as Pew points out, "the predominantly
Muslim countries surveyed, [where] anger toward the United States remains
pervasive, although the level of hatred has eased somewhat and support for
the war on terrorism has inched up.''145 Pew's analysis has implications for
the current Obama Administration that will affect not just the court of world
opinion, but ultimately perhaps the current members of the ICC; large
majorities in every country, except for the U.S., hold an unfavorable
opinion of President Bush.' 46 An important factor in the world's perception
of the United States, as noted by the Pew survey, "is the perception that the
U.S. acts internationally without taking account of the interests of other
nations. Large majorities in every nation surveyed, except the United
States, believe that America pays little or no attention to their country's
interests in making its foreign policy decisions.' 47  This goes against the
image believed by U.S. policymakers that the United States is a
141. The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, What the World Thinks in 2002 4
(The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2002).
142. The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Views of a Changing World, June
2003 1 (The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2003).
143. The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, A Year After Iraq War: Mistrust of
America in Europe ever Higher, Muslim Anger Persists 6 (The Pew Research Center for the People &
the Press 2004) [hereinafter A Year After Iraq War].
144. Foreign Reaction to Vote Restrained: Bush's Re-election Disappoints Many, THE
SEATrLE TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at A1 3.
145. A Year After Iraq War, supra note 143, at 1.
146. See The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, America's Image Further Erodes,
Europeans Want Weaker Ties: But Post-War Iraq Will Be Better Off, Most Say I (The Pew Research
Center for the People & the Press 2003).
147. A Year After Iraq War, supra note 143, at 6.
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"benevolent" hegemon whose "soft power" immunizes it against a backlash
from other countries' negative perception. 48 It is, however, this negative
view of the United States that has and will continue to affect the Obama
Administration's policies regarding the ICC.
1 49
V. CONCLUSION
The transformation in U.S. foreign policy, and world opinion directed
toward the Bush Administration, can be traced to world events since
September 11, 2001. This event affected President Bush in unforeseen
ways.' 50 The President's focus shifted from domestic to international
policy, with a clear focus on hunting down terrorists.' 5 ' In the process, he
became more willing to use American troops to hunt down al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan and elsewhere, and in the war against Iraq. In addition, the
events involving prisoner abuse by U.S. soldiers at the Guantanamo Bay
Naval Base has continued to cause negative world opinion toward the
former Bush Administration to grow. This and other events have opened
American soldiers, 152 U.S. citizens, 153 and theoretically the former President
himself' 54 to the possibility of prosecution before the Court, which came
into force on July 1, 2002. It is perhaps with this in mind that former
President Bush has consistently opposed this Court in his public
statements. 155
Thus, a central question is how the Obama Administration plans to
address the vulnerability of members of the Armed Forces of the United
States and U.S. civilians to the ICC's universal jurisdiction, in the current,
problematic context of changing world opinion directed against the U.S.
148. Christopher Layne, Offshore Balancing Revisited, in What Does the World Want from
America?, International Perspectives on U.S. Foreign Policy 172, 179 (Alexander T.J. Lennon ed., The
MIT Press 2002).
149. See Hirsh, supra note 119, at 175-76.
150. See Bruni, supra note 110, at 247.
151. See Renshon, supra note 114, at 278.
152. See Lee A. Casey, Assessments of the United States Position: The Case Against the
International Criminal Court, 25 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 840, 852-53 (2002).
153. See Michael E. Guillory, Civilianizing the Force: Is the United States Crossing the
Rubicon?, 51 A.F.L. REV. 111, 132 (2001).
154. See Darryl Robinson, The Rome Statute and its Impact on National Law, in Volume II,
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, 1849, 1855
(Antonio Cassese, et al. eds., Oxford University Press 2002); Danilenko, supra note 72, at 1875.
155. Remarks with President Alvaro Uribe, supra note 16; see also Transcript Part I:
Candidates tackle Iraq, CNN, supra note 124.
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foreign policies. 56 This opinion in recent years has become dramatically
more negative, especially in Middle Eastern countries. 157  Given this
continued negative change, President Obama will likely be challenged both
to gain international support for his foreign-policy goals and to prevent
countries from bringing U.S. nationals before the Court as the
Administration pursues those goals militarily. Hoge notes, "[t]he United
States bowed... to broad opposition on the [U.N.] Security Council and
announced it was dropping its effort to gain immunity for its troops from
prosecution by the International Criminal Court. 158 Thus, there remains an
increased possibility that a U.S. citizen can be brought before the ICC.
That possibility has only increased as more reports detail abuses to
prisoners by U.S. troops and their superiors and as others call for actions to
be taken against those who commit those abuses. As Schulz, Executive
Director of Amnesty International USA, states in his annual report,
If the US government continues to shirk its responsibility,
Amnesty International calls on foreign governments to uphold
their obligations under international law by investigating all
senior US officials involved in the torture scandal. And if those
investigations support prosecution, the governments should arrest
any official who enters their territory and begin legal proceedings
against them. The apparent high-level architects of torture should
think twice before planning their next vacation to places like
Acapulco or the French Riviera because they may find
themselves under arrest as Augusto Pinochet famously did in
London in 1998.159
Thus, as calls such as this continue, it is perhaps only a matter of time
before those seeking justice request the Court's assistance to prosecute a
U.S. citizen for crimes committed abroad. This paper has looked at the
possible procedure through the Court that a U.S. citizen could go through in
case such an event occurred.
In conclusion, the future of this Obama Administration's policies
toward the ICC will continue to change due to the evolving world opinion
with regards to U.S. foreign intervention. The Obama Administration's
156. See A Year After Iraq War, supra note 143, at 6.
157. See A Year After Iraq War, supra note 143, at 1.
158. Warren Hoge, US. Drops Plan to Exempt G.l's from UN. Court, N.Y. TiMEs, June 24,
2004, at Al.
159. Statement Of Dr. William F. Schulz Executive Director, available at
http://www.amnestyusa.organnualreport/statement.html (last visited July 27, 2009).
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direction must include a greater respect for world opinion through acts
intended to bring about this change for the betterment of all those involved.
